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By BRUCE HAY AND KATHRYN E. SPIER*
Should the manufacturer of a product be held
legally responsible if a consumer, while using
the product, harms someone else? This is a
question that has long vexed courts. Manufac-
turers might be held liable for accidental harms
caused by the consumer, such as when a lawn-
mower ﬂings a stone that hits a neighbor in the
eye or when a driver of a car hits a pedestrian.
1
Manufacturers might also be held liable if the
consumer intentionally causes harm, for exam-
ple, when a gun is used to commit murder.
Indeed, recently many lawsuits have been
brought against ﬁrearms manufacturers for the
deaths and injuries caused by criminals who use
guns. Although such lawsuits have generally
been unsuccessful,
2 these issues remain hotly
discussed in the legal and political arenas.
3
We consider a model of a dangerous product
supplied by a perfectly competitive market. The
product’s use has some tendency to harm
others—either accidentally or intentionally—
and both the manufacturers and the consumers
can take actions to reduce the likelihood of the
harm. For example, gun owners can take greater
care while handling and storing their guns (to
avoid accidental shootings) and can refrain from
committing crimes; likewise, gun manufactur-
ers can make investments in safety features such
as mechanical gun locks (reducing the likeli-
hood that a child inadvertently shoots a sibling)
or can refrain from producing highly lethal
products, such as armor-piercing bullets.
We show that consumer liability, not manu-
facturer liability, is optimal when consumers
have deep pockets and can pay for the harms
that they cause; solvent consumers fully inter-
nalize the social risks associated with their
product use. This has three desirable effects.
First, consumers take the optimal degree of care
when using dangerous products. Second, they
demand optimal safety features in the products
that they buy. Third, the equilibrium market
quantity is efﬁcient because the market price
plus the consumer’s expected liability reﬂects
the true social cost of the dangerous product.
4
On the other hand, manufacturer liability may
be optimal when consumers lack the ﬁnancial
resources to pay for the harms they cause. In a
representative-consumer setting, we show that
the consumer should bear primary responsibil-
ity for the damages, while manufacturers should
be held responsible for the shortfall not covered
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1 See Dugan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 447 N.E.2d 1055
(Ill. App. 1983) (lawnmower) and Houvenagle v. Wright,
340 N.W.2d 783 (Ia. App. 1983) (automobile). Lawsuits
involving such other products as alcohol, pesticides, ciga-
rette lighters, and computer games abound.
2 Exceptions involve situations where the consumer
accidentally injured someone as a result of a product
malfunction. If a car’s brakes fail, for example, the
pedestrian may be able to recover from the manufacturer,
provided that the brake failure is not the consumer’s
fault. If the product functioned as it was designed to,
however, or if the consumer deliberately inﬂicted the
injury, courts have traditionally refused to hold the man-
ufacturer liable.
3 A number of lawsuits are pending in federal and state
courts in which the plaintiffs seek to relax or bypass the
traditional rule immunizing manufacturers from deliberately
inﬂicted harms. State and federal legislatures have re-
sponded by attempting to codify the manufacturers’ immu-
nity from liability. For example, two bills before Congress,
H.R. 1036 and S. 659, would “prohibit civil liability actions
from being brought or continued against manufacturers,
distributors, dealers or importers of ﬁrearms or ammunition
for damages resulting from the misuse of their products by
others.”
4 See Koichi Hamada (1976). This may not be true if
consumers misperceive risks (A. Michael Spence, 1977).
1700by the consumer. We call this rule “residual-
manufacturer liability.” Although consumers
take inadequate precautions when using risky
products,
5 this rule gives manufacturers the cor-
rect incentive to design and produce safer prod-
ucts and insures that the market price reﬂects
the manufacturers’ expected future liability,
leading to the efﬁcient market quantity.
6
Importantly, we show that residual-manufacturer
liability may be undesirable when consumers
are heterogeneous. Residual-manufacturer lia-
bility leads to quantity distortions, for example,
when the consumers’ elasticity of demand is
systematically correlated with the social harm
that they cause. If safe consumers are more
price sensitive than their harmful counterparts,
then residual-manufacturer liability may de-
press the market quantity so much that society
as a whole is better off imposing liability on the
consumers alone.
7 Residual-manufacturer lia-
bility may also lead to quality distortions. If
consumers have private information about their
heterogeneous ﬁnancial assets, for example,
then the solvent consumers purchase exces-
sively safe products in equilibrium. Again, it
may be better to impose liability on the con-
sumers alone.
The issues raised here are distinct from those
in the large literature that focuses on product
injuries to consumers themselves. Simply put,
product injuries to consumers are largely inter-
nalized in well-functioning markets (Hamada,
1976; Willaim M. Landes and Richard A. Pos-
ner, 1985 and 1987).
8 Even without manufac-
turer liability imposed by law, consumers would
be willing to pay a premium for safer products
that reduce their personal risk and to use risky
products prudently. Consequently, the eco-
nomic arguments for products liability for con-
sumer injuries have focused on situations
involving transaction costs and market imper-
fections. Manufacturer liability for consumer
injuries may be desirable, for example, when
consumers misperceive product risks (Spence,
1977; Dennis Epple and Artur Raviv, 1978; A.
Mitchell Polinsky and William P. Rogerson,
1983), or when manufacturers have private in-
formation about the safety of their products or
take unobservable actions that affect product
safety (Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F.
Reinganum, 1995 and 1997).
9
Section I highlights the optimality of residual-
manufacturer liability in a representative consumer
framework. Section II shows that residual-
manufacturer liability can distort the market
quantity in an example where consumers have
heterogeneous demand curves and harm pro-
pensities. Section III shows that residual-
manufacturer liability can distort product safety
in an example where consumers are privately in-
formed about their wealth levels. Section IV con-
cludes. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
I. The Basic Framework
We begin with the case of a representative
consumer purchasing a harmful product from a
perfectly competitive market. The probability
that a single unit of the good will cause an
injury is (x, y), where x  0 is the manufac-
turer’s investments in product safety and y  0
is the consumer’s precaution level. Product
safety is perfectly observable to the consumer at
the time that he makes his purchase decisions.
The manufacturers have identical constant-
returns-to-scale production technologies with
marginal production cost x (we normalize the
other production costs to zero). We assume that
(x, y) is decreasing in each argument, is
strictly convex, and that Limx30 1(x, y)  
5 StevenShavell(1986)formalizestheso-called“judgment-
proof problem.”
6 Shavell (1980) showed that the higher price leads to
a better market quantity but did not discuss residual-
manufacturer liability or the heterogeneity issues discussed
here.
7 Previous legal commentators, Note (1995) and Bonney
(1985), have argued in favor of manufacturer liability for
gun misuse. With the exception of Hay’s (1999) informal
analysis, the quantity distortion issue has been unaddressed
in the literature.
8 Consumers and manufacturers jointly absorb the costs
of injuries (with the allocation depending upon the contract
struck between them) and therefore have a joint incentive to
take optimal precautions. Early descriptive work includes
Guido Calabresi (1961) and Roland N. McKean (1970).
9 The issues here are reminiscent of vicarious liability
(Alan O. Sykes, 1998; Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci and
Francesco Parisi, 2002), holding employers liable for the
negligence of their employees, for example. Our problem
differs in that employers exert some supervision over their
employees and can discharge unsatisfactory employees.
Manufacturers, on the other hand, typically cannot control
how their products are used after the sale.
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10 This last condi-
tion implies that the marginal return from the
ﬁrst dollar of investment is arbitrarily large.
When injured, the third parties suffer dam-
ages d  0. Consumers are said to be insolvent
or “judgment-proof” when their future assets, w,
are insufﬁcient to cover d.
11 In contrast to the
consumers, manufacturers are assumed to have
deep pockets. The representative consumer re-
ceives a marginal beneﬁt P(q) from consuming
the q
th unit of the good. This is the inverse
demand curve net of any liability concerns.
Social welfare is given by:
12
(1) Sx, y, q

0
q
Pz  x, yd  x  y dz.
The ﬁrst-best market outcome, x*, y*, and q*,
are the values that maximize this expression.
The competitive market chooses these values
privately, of course, in the shadow of future
liability. We consider the general class of strict
liability rules, {
c, 
m}, which allocates damages

c  w to the consumer and 
m to the manu-
facturer.
13 We also highlight two speciﬁc rules.
With “consumer-only liability,” the consumer
pays for third-party damages to the point
where his or her ﬁnancial assets are ex-
hausted, 
c  min{d, w} and 
m  0. With
“residual-manufacturer liability,” the manufac-
turer is held legally liable for the shortfall in dam-
ages, 
c  min{d, w} and 
m  d  min{d, w}.
Manufacturers compete by offering price-
safety pairs to attract the representative con-
sumer. The manufacturers are the “leaders” (so
to speak), choosing price and product safely
ﬁrst while the representative consumer is a “fol-
lower,” subsequently choosing his quantity and
precautions. In equilibrium, consumer surplus is
maximized subject to three constraints:
(2) Max
	p,x
 
0
q
Pz  x, y
c  y  p dz
(3) s.t. 2x, y
c  1  0
(4) Pq  x, y
c  y  p
(5) p  x  x, y
m.
The ﬁrst constraint reﬂects that the consumer
chooses his precautions, y, to minimize the ex-
pected private cost associated with product use.
The second constraint says that the consumer
consumes to the point where his marginal value
of consumption is exactly offset by his expected
unit cost. The ﬁnal inequality constrains manu-
facturers to earn nonnegative proﬁts.
PROPOSITION 1: When the representative
consumer is fully solvent, consumer-only liabil-
ity achieves the ﬁrst-best market outcome.
When the representative consumer pays in
full for the damages that he causes, he will
invest optimally in precautions to avoid harm-
ing others. Furthermore, the consumer is willing
to pay a premium to manufacturers for opti-
mally safe products, and the competitive market
delivers exactly what he wants. Finally, the
consumer purchases the socially optimal quan-
tity because his unit cost reﬂects the full social
cost: the sum of the marginal cost of production,
the cost to the consumer of taking precautions,
and the expected damages to third parties.
10 i(x, y) is the derivative with respect to argument i 
x, y.
11 Note that the price that the consumers pay ex ante is
not deducted from their future wealth. This is quite realistic
when injuries are low-probability events. Similar results
would be obtained if consumers have deep pockets but there
is a low probability of being held responsible for the
damages.
12 While our notation naturally reﬂects accidental harms,
the framework is also valid for intentional harms, including
crimes. Even criminals can take actions to reduce unneces-
sary losses (collateral property damage, injuries, and deaths)
while engaging in criminal activities, and can spend effort
searching for noncriminal alternatives (getting a job, going
to school). Criminals may also borrow or steal guns from
consumers; liability gives consumers the incentive to safe-
guard their ﬁrearms. The proper treatment of the criminal’s
utility in the social welfare function is debatable, of course,
and not addressed here.
13 Note that this class does not include rules where the
liability depends on the precautions taken by the manufac-
turer and the consumer. Negligence rules are discussed in
the conclusion. We are implicitly assuming that only one
injury can occur for a given consumer. This is justiﬁed if
injuries occur with a random arrival rate and economic
activity ceases after the ﬁrst one.
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The ﬁrst-best outcome is clearly not achieved
with consumer-only liability. Since the con-
sumer bears less than full responsibility for the
harms he causes, he will take too few precau-
tions to avoid harming others. Since products
are designed with only the consumer’s prefer-
ences in mind, manufacturers will underinvest
in safety features. Finally, the consumer pur-
chases too much of the product, as his unit cost
of consumption falls short of the true social
cost.
PROPOSITION 2: When the representative
consumer has limited ﬁnancial assets, residual-
manufacturer liability is optimal within the
class of strict liability rules.
It is unavoidable that consumer precautions
fall short of their ﬁrst-best levels, but putting
primary responsibility on the consumer at least
pushes his precautions in the right direction.
Putting residual responsibility on the manufac-
turer leads the market price to reﬂect the man-
ufacturer’s share of the expected future
damages in addition to the production cost. This
is socially desirable because the consumer’s
unit cost will fully reﬂect the social cost of the
risky product and so the market quantity is
socially optimal. Finally, this rule leads the
manufacturers to invest optimally in product
safety. Intuitively, this happens because the
manufacturer and the consumer are jointly re-
sponsible for the full social harm to third
parties.
Other policy instruments, such as taxation
and mandatory insurance policies for consum-
ers, will perform well on some—but not all—
dimensions. These alternative instruments, if
carefully chosen, will achieve the desired mar-
ket quantity. They will not, by themselves, get
consumers to take additional care or manufac-
turers to implement socially desirable safety
features. Taxes would need to be coupled
with other instruments—regulations or negli-
gence-based liability rules, perhaps—in order
to mimic all of the beneﬁts of residual-
manufacturer liability.
The basic model can be extended in a number
of ways without changing the basic conclusion.
The results hold in situations where consumers
themselves are harmed in addition to the third
parties.
14 They also hold when the harms to
others are stochastic rather than deterministic.
The framework could be easily extended to
include nonﬁnancial sanctions, such as criminal
penalties for careless or malicious product use.
While useful, these supplements would not gen-
erally achieve the ﬁrst best: the combined threat
of civil and criminal liability is generally insuf-
ﬁcient to induce efﬁcient behavior. Finally, the
framework could be extended to situations
where product safety features interfere with
product use, diluting the value that the con-
sumer derives from the product.
15
The optimality of residual-manufacturer liabil-
ity is maintained with some forms of consumer
heterogeneity. Importantly, the representative
consumer’s inverse demand curve P(q) can be
easily reinterpreted as representing a continuum
of consumers who differ in the value they place
on consuming a single unit of the good. Residual-
manufacturer liability is socially desirable so
long as the different consumer types all have the
same wealth level and the same propensity to
cause social harm, h. The next two sections
highlight why residual-manufacturer liability
may be undesirable when these other forms of
heterogeneity are introduced.
II. Quantity Distortions: Heterogeneous Harm
Levels
This section allows consumers to differ from
one another in both their price sensitivities and
in the social harms they cause to third parties.
We show that residual-manufacturer liability
can distort the market quantity when these pa-
rameters are correlated in the consumer popu-
lation. Indeed, residual-manufacturer liability
may create such large distortions in the market
quantity that it would be better to have no
manufacturer liability at all.
14 The working paper version of this paper, available on
the Social Science Research Network (http://SSRN.com/
abstract434780), includes consumer harm. This feature
has been dropped to streamline the exposition.
15 The framework could be extended to consider imper-
fect competition. Residual-manufacturer liability would
clearly change market prices in this case, too, although the
change may not be efﬁcient. Additional work on these
issues is needed.
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in order to focus attention on quantity distor-
tions. First, neither the manufacturers nor the
consumers can affect the probability of injuries
to others, x  y  0. Second, consumers are
assumed to be totally insolvent following these
injuries, w  0. We extend the earlier frame-
work to allow for two types of customers, i 
H, L. We will refer to these two types as the
“harmful group” and the “safe group,” respec-
tively. The expected social harm of a single unit
of the product in the hands of a type i consumer
is i  idi and we assume that H  L  0.
The inverse demand curve of type i consumers
is Pi(q), and the corresponding demand curve is
Di(p). We assume that it is impossible for man-
ufacturers to distinguish between the two types
of customers and therefore cannot engage in
price discrimination.
An all-knowing social planner would, of
course, set different prices for the two groups of
consumers, but this is infeasible, given our as-
sumptions. The appropriate benchmark has the
social planner setting a single price for both
groups. This second-best price must reﬂect the
social harm associated with the sale of one
additional unit, or the marginal social harm:
16
(6) p* 
HD Hp*  LD Lp*
D Hp*  D Lp* .
With residual-manufacturer liability, the com-
petitive equilibrium price reﬂects the manufac-
turer’s expected liability associated with a sale
of one unit, or the average social harm:
17
(7) p
R 
HDHp
R  LDLp
R
DHp
R  DLp
R .
When the average and marginal harm values
diverge, residual-manufacturer liability distorts
the equilibrium market quantity.
PROPOSITION 3: If the harmful consumer
group has a more elastic demand curve than the
safe consumer group, then the market quantity
under residual-manufacturer liability is higher
than the second-best quantity. If the harmful
consumer group has a less elastic demand
curve, then the equilibrium market quantity is
lower than the second-best quantity.
Suppose that the harmful consumer group has
a more elastic demand curve than the safe con-
sumer group. When the market price rises, the
percentage of harmful consumers who leave the
market is larger than the percentage of safe
consumers who leave. It follows that the mar-
ginal purchaser (i.e., the consumer who is in-
different between buying the gun and not
buying the gun at the going price) is more likely
to be a harmful consumer than the average pur-
chaser in the market. Since residual-manufacturer
liability effectively “taxes” manufacturers for
the average social harm, the market price will
be inefﬁciently low and the market quantity
inefﬁciently high. Conversely, when the harm-
ful consumer group has a less elastic demand
curve, then when the market price rises the safe
consumers leave the market at a higher rate
than harmful consumers. The marginal pur-
chaser is more likely to be a safe type than the
average purchaser. In this case, manufacturers
are “over-taxed” with residual-manufacturer
liability.
PROPOSITION 4: When the harmful consumer
group has a more elastic demand than the safe
consumer group, then residual-manufacturer
liability performs better than consumer-only
liability. When the harmful consumer group has
a less elastic demand, then residual-manufacturer
liability may perform better or worse than
consumer-only liability.
Residual-manufacturer liability can have di-
sastrous consequences when the harmful con-
sumers are less price sensitive than their safe
counterparts. The consumers who cause the
least social harm are the ﬁrst to drop out of the
market when the market price rises, while the
consumers who cause the most social harm are
the ones more likely to remain. Consumer-only
liability may be preferable because it keeps the
safe consumers in the market.
16 Suppose that price falls so that exactly one more unit
is sold. With probability D H(p*)/[D H(p*)  D L(p*)], the
additional unit is sold to a type H consumer, and with
probability D L(p*)/[D H(p*)  D L(p*)], it is sold to a con-
sumer of type L. Multiplying these probabilities by the
associated social harms, H and L gives the expression.
17 The total social harm HDH(p)  LDL(p) divided by
the total quantity DH(p)  DL(p).
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ample. Suppose there is a population of con-
sumers, each of whom demands at most one
unit of the good. Each unit costs $10 to produce.
Suppose that 99 percent of the population
causes no harm but 1 percent causes harm of
$300. Furthermore, suppose that the safe con-
sumers value the product less than the harmful
consumers: L  $12.99 and H  $310.01.
Both types of consumer “should” purchase the
product in this example: 99 percent of the pop-
ulation creates a surplus of $2.99 while 1 per-
cent of the population creates a social value of
a penny. With consumer-only liability, compe-
tition drives the price down to p  $10, the
marginal cost of production. The socially opti-
mal outcome is obtained: all consumers—safe
and harmful alike—buy the product. Now con-
sider residual-manufacturer liability. If both
types of consumer purchased the product, the
price would be p  $13, above safe consumers’
valuation of $12.99. So the safe consumers
would be driven from the market and the price
would subsequently rise to p  $310, the mar-
ginal cost, $10, plus the expected social harm
caused by harmful types, $300. Only the harm-
ful 1 percent of the population purchases the
product, and, for these harmful consumers, the
“social surplus” is just a penny. Social welfare
has obviously fallen.
18
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose that the variance
in the population’s harms grows while holding
the average harm constant at price p
R. If the
harmful consumer group has a less elastic de-
mand curve than the safe consumer group, then
consumer-only liability becomes more attrac-
tive relative to residual-manufacturer liability.
When the two consumer types are equally
harmful, residual-manufacturer liability clearly
dominates consumer-only liability (indeed, it
achieves the second-best market outcome; see
Proposition 3). When the variance in harms
grows, however, then residual-manufacturer li-
ability diverges from the second-best and be-
comes relatively less desirable. The proposition
holds social welfare under residual-manufacturer
liability ﬁxed (by holding average harm con-
stant at p
R) and performs the comparative static
on consumer-only liability. Alternatively, one
could hold social welfare ﬁxed under consumer-
only liability and show that residual-manufacturer
liability becomes relatively less desirable, al-
though this is less straightforward to prove.
Our analysis has restricted attention to two
speciﬁc liability rules: residual-manufacturer
and consumer-only liability. Social welfare
would of course be higher if the social planner
could ﬁne-tune the rule. Damage multipliers
would be a valuable supplementary instrument
to residual-manufacturer liability, for example.
The optimal multiplier would be less than one
when consumers with less elastic demands
cause more social harm, effectively lowering
the manufacturers’ liability to reﬂect marginal
harm. Similarly, it would be greater than one
when the less elastic consumers cause less so-
cial harm. Alternatively, the social planner
could impose a direct tax on the manufacturers,
reﬂecting the marginal social harm of the activ-
ity. These policies would, of course, require that
the court understand a host of market charac-
teristics, including the nature of demand curves,
harm levels, and correlations. They would also
compromise the desirable impact manufacturer
liability has on product design.
III. Quality Distortions: Heterogeneous
Financial Assets
This section introduces a second kind of con-
sumer heterogeneity: heterogeneous ﬁnancial
assets. Proportion 	 of the consumer population,
the “type 0” consumers, are completely insol-
vent following an injury (w0  0). Proportion
1  	 of the consumer population, the “type 1”
consumers, are fully solvent (w1  d). Finally,
we assume that the probability of harm is addi-
tively separable in manufacturer and consumer
precautions, 12(x, y)  0.
19 We will charac-
terize incentive-compatible pairs of product of-
ferings, {p0, x0} and {p1, x1}, where the
insolvent consumers select the former and the
solvent consumers select the latter. The pair of
product offerings is a competitive equilibrium if
18 If the social surplus for the unsafe consumers were
negative, the market would disappear.
19 This implies that a consumer’s choice of precautions is
independent of product safety features.
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deviating to a different price-safety combina-
tion. Finally, the equilibrium is said to be pool-
ing when {p0, x0}  {p1, x1} and separating
otherwise.
As before, we focus on two basic liability
rules. With consumer-only liability, the dam-
ages are paid by the consumer when he is fully
solvent, and go uncompensated otherwise, {1
c,
1
m}  {d, 0} and {0
c, 0
m}  {0, 0}. With
residual-manufacturer liability, the damages are
paid by the consumer when he is fully solvent,
but are paid by the manufacturer if the con-
sumer is insolvent, {1
c, 1
m}  {d, 0} and {0
c,
0
m}  {0, d}.
PROPOSITION 6: With consumer-only liabil-
ity, the solvent consumers’ purchasing deci-
sions and precautions are at their ﬁrst-best
levels. The insolvent consumers purchase un-
safe products, take too few precautions, and
consume too much.
As in Section I, the insolvent customers do
not care enough about safety, and the com-
petitive market gives them exactly what they
want: a cheap and relatively dangerous prod-
uct. Subsequently, they are not careful enough
to avoid harming others and overconsume the
product. The fully solvent consumers, on the
other hand, are held personally accountable
for any third-party damages, and therefore
demand safer products from the manufactur-
ers and use them prudently. In short, the
competitive market supplies the solvent con-
sumers “efﬁciently.”
LEMMA 7: Suppose the consumers’ types are
observable and price discrimination is feasible.
With residual-manufacturer liability, all con-
sumers purchase optimally safe products. The
price paid by the solvent consumers reﬂects
marginal production costs only while the insol-
vent consumers pay a premium that reﬂects the
manufacturer’s future liability. Conditional on
product safety and consumer precautions, efﬁ-
cient market quantities are obtained.
This full-information benchmark may be un-
derstood intuitively. Solvent consumers demand
optimally safe products because primary liabil-
ity forces them to internalize the social harms
they cause. Insolvent consumers do not person-
ally internalize the harm, but the manufacturers
supplying them are forced to internalize the
harm through residual-manufacturer liability (as
in Section I). The solvent consumers pay ex
post for the harm that they cause, while the
insolvent consumers pay ex ante through a
higher market price.
This benchmark is not sustainable when the
consumers are privately informed. Since the
insolvent consumers pay a higher price than
their solvent counterparts, the insolvent con-
sumers would obviously pretend to be solvent
in order to secure the lower price. In other
words, the full-information benchmark is not
incentive compatible.
PROPOSITION 8: Suppose that consumers’
types are private information. With residual-
manufacturer liability, a pooling equilibrium
does not exist. There does exist a unique sepa-
rating equilibrium when the proportion of in-
solvent consumers is not too small. The fully
solvent consumers purchase excessively safe
products, and the insolvent consumers purchase
optimally safe products. Conditional on the pre-
caution levels, the efﬁcient market quantities
are obtained.
A detailed proof is given in the Appendix, but
the main ideas may be understood intuitively. If
a pooling equilibrium did exist, the market price
would have to be inﬂated to reﬂect the manu-
facturers’ liability associated with the insolvent
consumers. Consumers who are solvent face
primary liability for third-party harm, and there-
fore place greater weight on product safety than
do their insolvent counterparts. A clever manu-
facturer could skim off these safety-sensitive
consumers in the following way: offer a safer
product at a price that only the solvent consum-
ers would prefer. The manufacturer would
avoid future liability himself and earn positive
proﬁts.
This intuition is applicable in understanding
the separating equilibrium as well. The market
supplies a product with optimal built-in safety
features to the insolvent consumers who pay for
manufacturers’ future liability up front through
an inﬂated price. If the solvent consumers pur-
chased this product, too, they would effectively
have to pay twice for liability: once up front
1706 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2005through the market price and then later when a
third party suffers damages. But the competitive
market supplies the solvent consumers with a
very different product—a safer product at a
higher price. This ultra-safe product is priced
“fairly”—the solvent consumers are paying
only the manufacturing costs and so their pur-
chase decisions are efﬁcient given the safety
measures—but the safety measures themselves
are inefﬁciently high. When 	, the proportion of
insolvent consumers, is small, then a competi-
tive equilibrium fails to exist. The reason is
simple: a clever manufacturer could proﬁtably
deviate from the separating equilibrium and of-
fer a product with socially optimal safety fea-
tures and a relatively low price that both
consumer types would prefer.
This proposition is analogous to Michael
Rothschild and Joseph E. Stiglitz’s (1976) fa-
mous result that competitive insurance markets
may have no equilibrium. Many authors have
suggested changes to Rothchild and Stiglitz’s
timing to restore the existence of equilibrium.
John G. Riley (1979) proposed a dynamic ad-
justment process where ﬁrms could modify
their product offerings in light of a deviation.
The separating equilibrium described above is a
so-called “reactive equilibrium” when 	 is low
as well. The idea behind this is that if a deviator
did indeed make an offer that both types of
consumer preferred, then another ﬁrm could
react to this deviation and skim off the solvent
consumers.
20 (A similar logic was used to break
the pooling equilibrium.)
PROPOSITION 9: If the proportion of insol-
vent consumers is above a cutoff, then the sep-
arating outcome with residual-manufacturer
liability is strictly preferred to the equilibrium
with consumer-only liability. If the proportion
of insolvent consumers is below the cutoff, then
consumer-only liability is preferred.
From Proposition 6, consumer-only liability
achieves the ﬁrst-best outcome for solvent
types, while the insolvent types overconsume
unsafe products and take too little care while
using them. Residual-manufacturer liability, on
the other hand, distorts the product safety sup-
plied to the solvent customers in the separating
equilibrium (Proposition 8). It follows that con-
sumer-only liability is preferred when there are
sufﬁciently many solvent consumers in the pop-
ulation, but not when the population is domi-
nated by insolvent consumers.
IV. Conclusion
There are sound economic reasons to hold
manufacturers liable for the injuries their prod-
ucts cause to nonconsumers. Since consumers
typically cannot be held responsible for 100
percent of the harms that they cause, placing
liability on consumers alone will lead to the
overconsumption of products with inadequate
safety features. In a representative-consumer
framework, the best strict liability rule holds the
consumer liable for third-party damages, up to
the point that their ﬁnancial assets allow, and
then holds the manufacturer liable for the short-
fall in damages.
21 When consumers are hetero-
geneous, however, residual-manufacturer liability
can lead to undesirable distortions in the market
quantities and product safety features.
The formal analysis in this paper ignores the
costs of the legal system and assumes that vic-
tims are automatically compensated for their
losses. Holding manufacturers liable would
make practical sense only if the shortfall in
damages not paid by consumers (and the asso-
ciated beneﬁt of residual-manufacturer liability)
was large enough to justify the added expense
and transaction costs associated with the litiga-
tion process. Additional problems would arise if
overly sympathetic juries grant astronomical jury
awards, chilling the economic activity.
Taxes may be a viable alternative to residual-
manufacturer liability.
22 The optimal tax, which
20 The robustness of the separating equilibrium for low 	
is sensitive to the particular dynamic process, however.
Indeed, Charles A. Wilson (1977) restored the existence of
a pooling equilibrium in Rothschild-Stiglitz by allowing the
nondeviating ﬁrms to withdraw, but not modify, their offers
in light of a deviation. These extensions, and other reﬁne-
ments, are surveyed in Riley (2001).
21 The asymmetry in the treatment comes from the as-
sumption that consumers observe product attributes at the
time of purchase, but manufacturers cannot observe or con-
trol consumer care.
22 See Dennis W. Carlton and Glenn C. Loury (1980)
and Stephen F. Hamilton (1998) for discussions of Pi-
gouvian taxation and liability.
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imposed on either the manufacturers or the con-
sumers. Although taxation may have lower
transaction costs than residual-manufacturer li-
ability, it has several important drawbacks.
First, the planner would require both the time
and the ability to ﬁne-tune the taxes on a
market-by-market basis. Second, a tax by itself
would provide inadequate incentives for manu-
facturers to design safer products. A negligence
rule that holds manufacturers liable if their
safety features fall short of acceptable levels—or
regulations geared at product safety directly—
may prove useful supplements to taxation.
Note, however, that liability has the advantage
of putting responsibility for safety in the hands
of experts. Manufacturers are likely to be better
informed about the feasibility of product mod-
iﬁcations than are regulators.
Forcing consumers to purchase insurance
policies when they own dangerous products is
another possibility. This may suffer from the
same problems as residual-manufacturer liabil-
ity. If insurance providers cannot discriminate
among the different types of consumers, then
the competitive insurance premiums would re-
ﬂect the average rather than the marginal harm,
and the market quantity would be distorted.
Furthermore, in the absence of manufacturer
liability and other product safety regulations, man-
ufacturers would have insufﬁcient incentives to
produce safer products.
23 In this way, mandatory
insurance has the same problems as taxation.
The results of this paper raise the natural
question—and concern—about where the chain
of corporate responsibility should end. The model
assumes a single manufacturer, but harmful ac-
tivities will often involve multiple products and
multiple suppliers. Guns, for example, are espe-
cially dangerous when they are loaded with bul-
lets. Should the ammunition manufacturer be held
liable for deaths and injuries as well? Timothy
McVeigh created the bomb that destroyed the
Oklahoma City Federal Building by loading a
mixture of fertilizer with diesel fuel—purchased
at a Conoco service station—into a rented Ry-
der truck. Should the fertilizer manufacturer,
Conoco, and Ryder all be held responsible for
the 168 lives that were lost?
24 These issues
remain fruitful for further research.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 1 AND 2:
As a benchmark, suppose a social planner chooses x, q, and 
c. The consumer chooses y to
minimize his expected costs: (x, y)
c  y. Our earlier assumptions guarantee that this y is positive
and unique. Implicitly, y  f(x, 
c) where f(x, 
c)  0. Holding x ﬁxed, if 
c  d (
c  d) then the
consumer underinvests (overinvests) relative to what a social planner would do. The best liability
rule is 
c  min{d, w}. Substituting into (1), the social planner would choose x and q to maximize

0
q
Pz  x, fx, min	d, w
d  x  fx,m i n 	d, w
 dz.
The benchmark solution satisﬁes
x**  arg min
x
x, fx,m i n 	d, w
d  x  fx,m i n 	d, w
,
y**  fx**,min	d,w
,
Pq**  x**,y**d  x**  y**.
23 Indeed, one can interpret manufacturer liability as
bundling the product with an insurance policy.
24 See Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160
F.3d 613 (10th Cir. 1998) for a case against fertilizer man-
ufacturers.
1708 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2005Claim: The competitive equilibrium is the benchmark, {x ˆ, y ˆ, q ˆ}  {x**, y**, q**}, if and only if

c  min{d, w} and 
m  d  min{d, w}.
Proof of claim: Inequality (5) clearly binds, p  x  (x, y)
m. Substituting this and y  f(x, 
c)
into (2) and (4) gives an equivalent program:
Max
x 
0
q
Pz  x, fx, 
c
m  
c  x  fx, 
c dz
s.t. Pq  x,fx,
c
c  
m  x  fx,
c.
Using the envelope theorem, we ﬁnd the competitive equilibrium {x ˆ, y ˆ, q ˆ} satisﬁes
x ˆ  arg min
x
x, fx, 
c
c  
m  x  fx, 
c,
y ˆ  fx ˆ,
c,
Pq ˆ  x ˆ,y ˆ
c  
m  x ˆ  y ˆ.
{x ˆ, y ˆ, q ˆ}  {x**, y**, q**} with residual-manufacturer liability. With 
c  d and 
m  0, {x ˆ, y ˆ, q ˆ} 
{x*, y*, q*}.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
[HDH(p)  LDL(p)]/[DH(p)  DL(p)]  [HD H(p)  LD L(p)]/[D H(p)  D L(p)] if and only
if DH(p)D L(p)  D H(p)DL(p). Dividing both sides by DH(p)DL(p) and multiplying by p shows
this is equivalent to 
H(p)  
L(p). This orders the prices under residual-manufacturer liability and
the benchmark. The order of the quantities follows.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
With consumer-only liability, the price p
C  0. When 
H(p)  
L(p), then p*  p
R  p
C; when

H(p)  
L(p), then p
R  p*  p
C. The result follows from the quasiconcavity of social welfare.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
Holding the average harm, p
R, ﬁxed in equation (7), we may deﬁne L as a function of H: L(H)
where dL(H)/dH  DH(p
R)/DL(p
R). Social welfare with consumer-only liability (p
c  0) may
be written 0
DH(0) [PH(z)  H] dz  0
DL(0) [PL(z)  L(H)] dz. Differentiating with respect to H
and substituting the derivative of L(H) gives
DH0 
dL(H)
dH DL0  DH0 
DH(p
R)
DL(p
R)DL0.
This is positive if DH(p)/DL(p) is increasing in price or equivalently 
H(p)  
L(p).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:
Suppose perfect price discrimination is possible. It follows from Proposition 1 that the solvent
consumers will be efﬁciently supplied, x1  x* and y1  y*. For the insolvent consumers the market
outcome is x0  y0  0. The market price is p1  x* for the solvent consumers and p1  0 for the
1709 VOL. 95 NO. 5 HAY AND SPIER: MANUFACTURER LIABILITYinsolvent consumers. Incentive compatibility is satisﬁed so this is also the equilibrium with
incomplete information.
PROOF OF LEMMA 7:
For the solvent consumers, residual-manufacturer liability is equivalent to consumer-only liability,
so by Proposition 1 they are supplied efﬁciently. From the proof of Propositions 1 and 2, the
insolvent consumers take zero precautions y0  0, and manufacturer precautions satisfy x0 
arg minx (x,0 ) d  x. Therefore, x0  x* and P(q0)  (x*, 0)d  x*, the efﬁcient levels.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8:
Suppose a pooling equilibrium, {p ˆ, x ˆ}, does exist, and let 	 ˆ be the proportion of insolvent types.
Zero-proﬁts implies p ˆ  x ˆ  	 ˆ(x ˆ,0 ) d. Consider a deviation to {p ˜, x ˜}  {p ˆ  , x ˆ  
}. The
insolvent consumers prefer {p ˆ, x ˆ}t o{p ˜, x ˜} and the solvent consumer prefers {p ˜, x ˜}t o{p ˆ, x ˆ} when
0    [(x ˆ, y*)  (x ˆ  
, y*)]d. The deviator receives positive proﬁts when p ˜  x ˜ or   x ˆ
 
  p ˆ. Substituting for p ˆ gives   
  	 ˆ(x ˆ,0 ) d. When 
 is sufﬁciently small, this condition
is satisﬁed for any   0.
Claim: In any separating equilibrium, {p1
R, x1
R} and {p0
R, x0
R}, p1
R  x1
R and p0
R  x0
R  (x0
R,0 ) d.
Proof of claim: Suppose p0
R  x0
R  (x0
R,0 ) d. By deviating to {p0
R  , x0
R}, a manufacturer could
proﬁtably capture the type 0 market. (If he attracts the solvent consumers, too, all the better.)
Suppose that p1
R  x1
R. The incentive compatibility constraint for the insolvent consumer holds that
p0
R  p1
R. By deviating to a slightly higher safety level, {p1
R, x1
R  
}, a manufacturer could proﬁtably
capture the entire type 1 market.
Claim: x0
R  x*.
Proof of claim: {p0, x0}  {x*  (x*, 0)d, x*} is the outcome with perfect price discrimination.
If {p0
R, x0
R} did not have this form, then a deviator would steal the entire type 0 market {p0  , x0}.
(If the type 1 consumers accept, too, all the better for the deviator.)
Claim: x1
R  x*  (x*, 0)d.
Proof of claim: Given the two claims proved earlier, the IC constraints for the two types are:
(IC0) x*  x*, 0d  x1
R,
(IC1) x1
R  x1
R, y*d  x*  x*, 0d  x*, y*d.
(IC0) implies that x1
R  x*. If (IC0) were slack, then the type 1 consumers could be made better off
by lowering x1
R closer to x*. If (IC0) binds, then (IC1) is slack.
Claim: When 	 is sufﬁciently large, there is no unilateral deviation that both types would prefer.
Proof of claim: Suppose {p ˜, x ˜} is preferred by both types, and let 	 ˜ be the proportion of insolvent
types at that deviation. Positive proﬁts for the deviator implies p ˜  x ˜  	 ˜(x ˜,0 ) d. The deviation is
preferred by the insolvent consumers when p ˜  x*  (x*, 0)d  p0
R. Taken together, we have x ˜
 	 ˜(x ˜,0 ) d  x*  (x*, 0)d. When 	  1, then 	 ˜  1 as well, so this inequality is satisﬁed only
when {p ˜, x ˜}  {p0
R, x0
R}. We have already seen that the type 1 consumers would prefer {p1
R, x1
R},
a contradiction. Continuity completes the proof.
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Let Si
j be the social welfare associated with liability regime j for a representative consumer of type
i. Consumer-only liability is preferred if 	S0
C  (1  	)S1
C  	S0
R  (1  	)S1
R,o r( 1 	)(S1
C 
S1
R)  	(S0
R  S0
C). Note that S1
C  S1
R because solvent consumers are served efﬁciently under
consumer-only liability (Proposition 6) but not under residual-manufacturer liability (Proposition 8).
S0
R  S0
C because manufacturers supply efﬁcient safety features to the insolvent consumers under
residual-manufacturer liability, and the market quantity is optimal. The result follows.
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